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Out of Balance: Wrong Turns in Public 
Employee Speech Law 
Michael Toth 
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 346 
ABSTRACT 
Although scholars offer a variety of explanations for the modern Supreme Court’s 
public employee speech jurisprudence, they share a common presumption. 
According to the standard account, the modern era of public employee free speech 
law began in 1968, with the Court’s adoption of a balancing test in Pickering v. 
Board of Education. Contrary to this view, this Article argues that Pickering 
balancing is better characterized as a relic from a bygone era rather than the start of a 
new one. Balancing was once the Court’s standard method of judging First 
Amendment claims. When Pickering was decided, however, balancing was under 
attack. Consistent with the overall demise of free speech balancing, this Article 
shows that the Court began abandoning Pickering balancing the moment the standard 
was announced. Pickering itself was not decided on balancing grounds, and the 
public employee speech cases that followed it in the Supreme Court have avoided 
balancing. When Pickering is put into proper perspective, it is possible to identify an 
overlooked explanation for the modern Court’s public employee speech rulings. This 
Article tells the story of how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, unbeknownst 
to courts and commentators fixated on Pickering balancing, has been the true driving 
force behind a major area of First Amendment law for nearly fifty years. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
Michael Toth is a Fellow at Stanford Constitutional Law Center. He would like to 
thank Michael McConnell, Jud Campbell, Joel Lumer, and Joseph Toth for their 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
liver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously remarked that a policeman 
“may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”
1
 Public employee free speech 
doctrine has undoubtedly evolved since Holmes’s day, but exactly how 
is disputed. Commentators have pointed to numerous principles behind 








 the managerial prerogative,
5
 the return of the privilege 
doctrine,
6






This Article offers an alternative account. It argues that the modern 
Court for the most part has applied the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to speech restrictions on public employment. And when the 
Court has relied on other principles, it has remained faithful to the 
essential logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under this 
analytical framework, the dispositive factor is whether the condition—
the speech infringement—is germane to the public benefit— 
government employment. 
Although scholars posit different theories to explain the Supreme 
Court’s current doctrine, they share a common presumption. The 
consensus view maintains that the modern era of public employee free 
speech law began in 1968, with the Court’s opinion in Pickering v. 
                                                          
1
 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). 
2
 Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of 
Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009). 
3
 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and 
§ 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008). 
4
 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an 
Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173 (2007). 
5
 Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008). 
6
 Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907 (2011). 
7
 Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First 
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
8
 Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association 
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1064-67 
(2013) (concluding that “the only robust free speech rights government 
employees have is [sic] the right to refuse to support unions”). 
O 
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Board of Education.
9
 The Pickering framework, to be sure, sounds 
nothing like an unconstitutional conditions test. “The problem in any 
case,” the Pickering Court asserted, “is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”
10
 Commentators read Pickering as 
requiring an open-ended, fact-dependent inquiry.
11
 The dispositive 
factor is the weight of the burden on speech compared with that of the 
asserted public interest.
12
 Unconstitutional conditions analysis, by 
contrast, turns on the relationship between a means—the 
unconstitutional condition—and an end—the benefit subject to the 
condition.
13
 The approaches are quite distinct. One depends on 
relatedness, the other on significance. 
Contrary to the standard account, this article argues that 
Pickering’s balancing standard belongs to the bygone era of free 
speech balancing that began in the 1930s. During its heyday in the 
1950s and early 1960s, balancing was the Court’s standard approach 
for resolving First Amendment challenges.
14
 When Pickering was 
decided, however, free speech balancing was under attack from 
                                                          
9
 Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free 
Speech, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5, 7 (1999) (characterizing Pickering as the 
Supreme Court’s “first modern public employee-free speech case”); see also, 
Norton, supra note 2, at 8-10 (tracing “longstanding test for assessing” public 
employee speech claims back to Pickering); Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1176-77 
(asserting that Pickering began the era of constitutional protection for public 
employee speech). 
10
 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968). 
11
 Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1177 (describing Pickering balancing test as “ad hoc” 
and “fact- dependent”); Schoen, supra note 9, at 8 (characterizing the Court’s 
balancing approach in Pickering as “highly fact-intensive”); Paul Ferris 
Solomon, The Public Employee’s Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for A Fresh 
Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 453 (1986) (referring to Pickering balancing test 
as “open-ended”). 
12
 See Solomon, supra note 11, at 453. 
13
 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413 (1989) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions analysis in length 
and its many applications throughout first amendment jurisprudence). 
14
 See Solomon, supra note 11, at 450-52 (discussing the cases leading up to the 
seminal decision in Pickering). 
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members of the Court and academics. Balancing no longer survives as 
a general First Amendment doctrine.
15
 
Consistent with the overall demise of free speech balancing, the 
Court began departing from Pickering balancing in the public 
employment context essentially the moment the standard was 
articulated. Pickering itself was not decided on balancing grounds, and 
the public employee speech cases that followed it in the Supreme 
Court essentially pay lip service to the balancing standard. The inquiry 
has largely shifted to the relationship between the speech restriction 
and the privilege of public employment. This doctrinal development is 
obscured, to be sure, by the salience of the public-concern test, which 
the Court derived from the language of Pickering’s balancing standard 
and has applied in several public employee speech cases. This test, 
however, can be easily recast in unconstitutional conditions terms, and 
would make more sense doctrinally if formulated in this way. The 
Court’s public employee speech decisions since Pickering, in short, 
have followed the arc of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
With this claim in mind, this Article proceeds according to the 
following outline. Part II describes the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. This section explains that the doctrine emerged as a judicial 
device designed to ensure that the government does not exceed the 
boundaries of its lawful discretion over the provision of public 
benefits. Using the doctrine, the early twentieth-century Court 
permitted the state to impose restrictions on the receipt of public 
benefits where the reason for the restriction was related to the reason 
that the state created the public benefit in the first place. In other 
words, the doctrine did not force the state to compromise the 
legitimate policy behind a benefit. Provided that the condition was 
germane to the same ends that the state was pursuing through the 
benefit, it was safe. The doctrine precluded the state, however, from 
leveraging a gratuitous benefit to achieve unconstitutional ends 
unrelated to the reason behind the benefit. 
                                                          
15
 In United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), the Court rejected the balance 
of interest test as a “startling and dangerous” method for determining whether 
speech is protected under the First Amendment. “The First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech,” the Court explained, “does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American 
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the 
costs.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
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Part III discusses the balancing test. When the first public 
employee speech case reached the Court in 1947, the emerging view 
on the Court of First Amendment law was pragmatic. Rather than 
apply the existing unconstitutional conditions doctrine to restrictions 
on the privilege of public employment, the Court essentially created a 
new, and controversial, free speech doctrine. Part IV revisits 
Pickering. This section shows that the majority opinion followed the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine discussed in Part II. Lower courts 
and commentators misinterpret Pickering as requiring a balance of 
interest test. The balancing standard articulated in the case is pure 
dicta. Part V surveys the post-Pickering landscape. It divides the 
Court’s public employee free speech doctrine into four categories of 
cases, and demonstrates the relevance of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in three of these categories. In the fourth 
category—cases concerning public employees who are disciplined for 
controversial or insubordinate remarks—the Court has relied on the 
public-concern and citizen-speaker tests. Each of these tests can and 
should be replaced with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Part 
VI offers concluding remarks. 
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE—AN 
OVERVIEW 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine regulates the 
government’s power to bargain. When the government bargains, it 
does not impose a fine, imprisonment, or any other sanction on 
individuals who refuse the deal. It offers terms and conditions that may 
be accepted or rejected. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
addresses conditions that require the recipient of a public benefit to 
forfeit a constitutional right.
16
 
                                                          
16
 Not every condition triggers the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Where no 
constitutional right is forfeited, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has no 
place. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 60, 70 (2006) (holding that the Solomon Amendment’s conditional funding 
provision is not an unconstitutional condition because the First Amendment 
would not prevent Congress from directing the schools to provide equal access 
to military recruiters); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and 
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 323 (1935) (“If a state has power 
to impose a certain requirement by direct penal sanction, it can impose it as a 
condition to the grant of a privilege.”). 
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Before the emergence of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
courts upheld the imposition of unconstitutional conditions under the 
privilege doctrine. This now defunct doctrine was expressed as early 
as 1791, when the First Congress debated whether to prohibit federal 
excise tax collectors from electioneering.
17
 Representative Joshua 
Seney of New Hampshire argued that the law did not violate speech 
rights because “it would be optional to accept the offices or not.”
18
 
Others took the opposite view that the proposal was “unconstitutional, 
as it will deprive [excise officers] of speaking and writing their minds; 
a right of which no law can divest them.”
19
 Representative Fisher 
Ames of Massachusetts complained that the electioneering ban “will 
muzzle the mouths of freemen.”
20
 The Bill of Rights had not even 
been ratified, yet there were First Amendment problems already. 
The privilege doctrine started from the premise that government 
benefits are “optional.”
21
 The government has no obligation to provide 
them in the first place. Adherents to the doctrine reasoned that because 
the government has the “greater” power of declining to offer a benefit, 
it also has the “lesser” power of offering benefits but with strings 
attached.
22
 Even conditions that required the beneficiary to forfeit a 
constitutional liberty, such as the right to attend a political rally in the 




                                                          
17




 Id. at 1925. 
20
 Id. at 1926. 
21
 Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876) (holding that a state law 
permitting a foreign corporation to conduct business locally on the condition 
that it abstain from removing cases to federal court was constitutional because 
the law “gives the company the option” of accepting such terms). 
22
 W. Union Tel. Co. v. State of Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 54 (1910) (“I 
confess my inability to understand how a condition can be unconstitutional 
when attached to a matter over which a state has absolute arbitrary power.”) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897) 
(sustaining a city ordinance that required a permit to speak on public property on 
the ground that the city’s “right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily 
includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be 
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser”). 
23
 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892); Davis, 167 U.S. at 
48 (upholding condition that restricted speech on public property). 
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine shares the same 
conceptual foundation as the privilege doctrine. It takes for granted 
that government benefits are a privilege that need not be offered at 
all.
24
 Unlike the privilege doctrine, however, proponents of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine contend that, under certain 
circumstances, the government may not condition a privilege on the 
waiver of a constitutional right.
25
 A brief recounting of the 
development of the doctrine elucidates the special circumstances that 
render a condition unconstitutional. 
In its early formulation, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
prohibited conditions that burdened a constitutional right. In the 1926 
case of Frost v. Railroad Commission, for example, the Supreme 
Court held that a state could not condition the commercial use of 
public highways on compliance with regulations governing common 
carriers.
26
 The majority explained that the restriction threatened the 
viability of commercial truckers, who needed to use the highways to 
stay in business but could not afford to operate as common carriers.
27
 
The Court’s rationale, however, applied on its face to unconstitutional 
conditions of all degrees of magnitude. “A state is without power,” 
Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority, “to impose an 
unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege.”
28
 
Other Supreme Court opinions were equally unequivocal.
29
 
                                                          
24
 William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (1968) (describing common 
ground between unconstitutional conditions doctrine and privilege doctrine). 
25
 See id. 
26
 Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926). Common carriers 
were generally subject to broader regulatory controls than private carriers. In 
Frost, the state railroad commission was empowered to fix the rates and fares of 
common carriers, and impose other conditions that it regarded as necessary for 
public convenience. Id. at 590. 
27
 In the words of the majority, the statute left contract carriers with “a choice 
between the rock and the whirlpool—an option to forego a privilege which may 
be vital to his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an 
intolerable burden.” Id. at 593. 
28
 Id. at 598. 
29
 See, e.g., Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33 (1922) (holding that 
a state’s power to deny a benefit “is subject to the limitations of the supreme 
fundamental law”); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918) 
(stating that “a constitutional power cannot be used to accomplish an 
unconstitutional end). 
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Arguments from the state that unconstitutional conditions were 
sometimes incidental to the state’s legitimate regulatory authority 
persuaded the Court in Stephenson v. Binford to qualify the doctrine.
30
 
At first blush, the condition on public road use in Stephenson appears 
indistinguishable from the restriction held to infringe 
unconstitutionally on the due process rights of commercial truckers in 
Frost. The law in Frost required truckers to do business as common 
carriers.
31
 The statute in Stephenson forbade truckers, among other 
things, from charging lower shipping rates than the competitor 
common carriers charged.
32
 Both regimes, in short, prevented truckers 
from doing business on their own terms. 
In Frost, however, the Court was bound by the conclusion in the 
ruling below construing the statute not to be a regulation of the use of 
the highways.
33
 The Court understood the statute instead as an attempt 
to leverage the state’s authority over the use of public roads to convert 
private carriers into common carriers.
34
 Under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, states could not impose common 
carrier status on private shippers by mere legislative fiat.
35
 The state 
did not challenge this rule in Frost.
36
 The “naked question” in the case, 
then, was whether the state could achieve the same end “by imposing 
the unconstitutional requirement as a condition precedent to the 
enjoyment of a privilege.”
37
 
In Stephenson, by contrast, the ruling below upheld the minimum 
rate requirement as a valid exercise of the state’s regulatory authority 
over the use of the public roadways.
38
 Justice Sutherland, writing again 
for the majority, agreed. Public roads, he explained, existed primarily 
                                                          
30
 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932). 
31
 Frost, 271 U.S. at 589-90, 592. 
32
 Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 261-62. 
33
 Id. at 275 & n. 1 (citing pertinent section from Frost and quoting the state 
supreme court opinion). 
34
 Frost, 271 U.S. at 592 (describing case at hand as “that of a private carrier, who, 
in order to enjoy the use of the highways, must submit to the condition of 
becoming a common carrier”). 
35




 Id. at 592. 
38
 Stephenson v. Binford, 53 F.2d 509, 515-16 (S.D. Tex. 1931) (affirming statute 
as having the regulatory purpose of creating a “safe and dependable” system of 
transportation). 
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for the public at large.
39
 The preferred use of the state’s roadways was 
as a means of transport for private motorists, not as a place of business 
for commercial shippers.
40
 To preserve the roads for their primary 
function, the state could go as far as prohibiting truckers altogether 
from using publically-subsidized roads.
41
 The conditions on 
commercial use at issue in Stephenson, Sutherland further reasoned, 
were constitutional because they conserved the roads for public use.
42
 
Stephenson teaches several important lessons about the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine that remain true today. First, 
contrary to the initial articulation of the doctrine, not every 
unconstitutional condition makes a government action illegitimate. 
The validity of a condition depends on “germaneness.”
43
 A germane 
condition is one that serves the same policy ends that are responsible 
for the existence of the benefit itself.
44
 In Stephenson, the benefit—
public roads—existed primarily for the purpose of providing the public 
a means of transportation. The Court permitted the price floors on 
commercial carriers once it deemed this restriction to be operating in 
furtherance of the benefit’s animating purpose.
45
 
Second, Stephenson demonstrates that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine determines how closely a challenged restriction 
will be scrutinized. The plaintiffs in Stephenson argued that the rate 
controls infringed upon their due process rights.
46
 The controlling rule 
                                                          
39






 Id. at 272-74 (determining that the price controls had a “definite tendency to 
relieve the highways” of commercial traffic and therefore were a “means to the 
legitimate ends of conserving the highways”). 
42
 Id. at 272. 
43
 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee 
Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 2011-12 (2012); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1458-68 (1989); Hale, 
supra note 16, at 350-59. 
44
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (providing that a condition that 
furthers the purposes of a federal grant program does not violate constitutional 
rights); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) 
(explaining that the state had the right to prohibit or condition construction 
provided that the restriction served to protect the public’s view of the beach). 
45
 Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 272-74. 
46
 Id. at 263. 
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on rate controls provided that a state lacked the power to impose price 
floors on private businesses unless the regulated entities fit within the 
narrow category of businesses “affected with a public interest.”
47
 Most 




Justice Sutherland expressly confined his inquiry, however, to the 
separate question of whether the rate controls were a legitimate use of 
the state’s power to conserve the public roadways.
49
 Once he 
determined that the rate controls were germane to the state’s power to 
regulate the public roads, the Justice applied a different, more 
deferential standard of review.
50
 All that was necessary to sustain the 
rate controls was an “actual” relationship, regardless of the degree, 
between the reason for the price floors and the reason for the provision 
of public roads.
51
 The rate restrictions passed this test. 
In the public employment context, as we shall see, the 
germaneness inquiry determines the threshold question of whether the 
First Amendment applies. Restrictions that are germane to the purpose 
of the public employment in question are not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny, while non-germane speech restrictions are. 
Understanding that the germaneness inquiry is a threshold 
determination helps in spotting when the Court has (and hasn’t) relied 
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
Finally, Stephenson illustrates that the standard of review for 
determining whether a condition is germane has long been subject to 
some ambiguity. Justice Sutherland raised two potentially relevant 
factors in drawing the line between germane and non-germane 
conditions: (1) the closeness of the relationship between the condition 
                                                          
47
 Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 
(1927). 
48
 According to Robert Hale, there was “little doubt” that Justice Sutherland would 
have stricken the rate controls had he regarded them as non-germane to the 
state’s interest in highways conservation. Hale, supra note 16 at 349 (relying on 
Sutherland’s opinions invalidating rate controls in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 
278 U.S. 235 (1929) and Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), as well as the 
justice’s dissent in the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the price floors in 
Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)). 
49
 Stephenson, 287 U.S. at 265. 
50
 Id. at 272. 
51
 Id. 
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and the legitimate ends that the condition purports to serve,
52
 and (2) 
the relative significance of the legitimate ends within the context of the 
benefit subject to the condition.
53
 Stephenson set a minimal threshold 
with regard to the first factor.
54
 With regard to the second factor, 
however, Sutherland emphasized that the transportation of the public 
was the primary reason for which public highways were constructed.
55
 
Was a closer relationship between means and ends required where the 
desired ends were not so crucial to the existence of the public benefit? 
Stephenson does not say. 
Since Stephenson, moreover, the Court has not been entirely 
consistent in how it has defined the line between germane and non-
germane conditions. In the 1976 case of Elrod v. Burns, for example, a 
plurality of the Court maintained that an unconstitutional restriction on 
government privileges was valid only if it furthered some vital 
government ends by the means least restrictive of constitutionally 
protected rights.
56
 More recently, the Court has articulated a less 
exacting standard. Under this standard, conditions that advance the 
purpose of the benefit, rather than a vital governmental ends, are 
permissible.
57
 At the same time, the modern Court demands a stronger 
connection between ends and means than the minimal relationship 
required under Stephenson. It has stated that an “essential nexus” must 
exist between an unconstitutional condition and a legitimate end.
58
 
Conditions that have only “little” relevance to the reason behind the 
public benefit, furthermore, are now regarded as non-germane.
59
 
III.  THE BALANCING TEST 
The public employment speech cases from the pre-Pickering era 
are commonly viewed as something of a lagging indicator, a holdout 




 Id. at 264. 
54
 Id. at 265. 
55
 Id. at 264, 271. 
56
 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976). 
57
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991). 
58
 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
59
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (maintaining that a condition 
is invalid where there is “little or no connection” between the constitutional 
infringement and the public benefit). 
358 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 346 
from the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in cases dealing with non-employment public 
benefits. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court renounced the 
privilege doctrine in the 1920s, scholarship on public employee speech 
law gives the impression that the justices carved an exception for 
public employees, who continued to work on the government’s terms, 
unconstitutional conditions included, until the 1960s.
60
 
The standard account correctly identifies in the pre-Pickering era a 
considerable degree of deference to the state, but it gets the source of 
the Court’s deference wrong, mistakenly identifying the persistence of 
the privilege doctrine where the pre-Pickering Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence was the culprit. The Court’s general approach in First 
Amendment cases during this era was to weigh the interest of 
individual speakers against the public interest. The Court’s proponents 
of balancing, moreover, regarded political actors to be in a better 
position to strike the appropriate balance between competing societal 
interests. As a result, balancing generally favored regulation. 
A. Schneider v. State of New Jersey 
The era of First Amendment balancing began innocuously enough. 
In 1939, the Court in Schneider v. State heard a challenge to several 
municipal ordinances that restricted the use of public streets for the 
purpose of distributing handbills, pamphlets, and other printed 
materials.
61
 Before addressing the particulars of the challenged 
ordinances, the Court drew a distinction between lawful regulations of 
conduct that have the indirect effect of restricting speech—it gave the 
example of a traffic regulation that may be used to arrest a speaker 
who “take[s] his stand in the middle of a . . . crowded street”—and 
unlawful regulations of speech.
62
 After introducing the conduct-speech 
dichotomy, the Court offered the following guidance: 
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights 
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the 
                                                          
60
 Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2007) (providing 
that the privilege doctrine controlled cases involving restrictions on public 
employment until Pickering); Kathryn B. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The 
Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. 
J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 74 (2006) (same). 
61
 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
62
 Id. at 160-61. 
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challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs 
respecting matters of public convenience may well support 
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient 
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the 
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the 
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons 




The last sentence would be interpreted as an invitation, in each 
case, to balance the competing interests in speech, on the one hand, 
and the maintenance of social order, on the other.
64
 Taken in context, 
however, it is an unlikely candidate for a doctrinal shift. After the 
Court made the statement, it went on to strike down the ordinances as 
insufficiently tailored to the reasons asserted in support of restricting 
handbill distribution.
65
 The justices did not actually take up the 
“delicate” task of “weighing the circumstances.” 
B. Mitchell, Douds, and Dennis 
A trilogy of Supreme Court opinions made the use of the balancing 
test more explicit. The first two cases presented the classic 
unconstitutional conditions problem. The laws in question did not 
directly prohibit speech; they imposed a speech restriction as a 
condition on a public benefit. In both cases, United Public Workers of 
America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell and American Communications 
Association, C.I.O., v. Douds, the Court ignored the germaneness 
inquiry central to unconstitutional conditions analysis. The justices 
                                                          
63
 Id. at 161. 
64
 Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950) (citing 
Schneider as support for the application of a balance of interest test to a speech 
restriction attached as a condition to the receipt of a government benefit). 
65
 Three of the ordinances made it unlawful to circulate handbills on public streets; 
the fourth prohibited door-to-door solicitation without a police permit. 
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 154-58. The bans on circulation were justified on anti-
littering grounds, id. at 162, while the permit requirement was defended as a 
fraud protection measure. Id. at 159. The police-power theory behind the 
circulation ban failed because, as the Court dryly put it, “There are obvious 
methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who 
actually throw papers on the streets.” Id. at 162. Similarly, the Court found that 
laws against fraud and trespass were sufficient to remove any justification for 
the permit requirement. Id. at 164. 
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instead determined the constitutionality of the condition under a 
balancing test. 
In Mitchell, decided in 1947, the Court declared that to resolve a 
challenge brought against the Hatch Act’s ban on federal employees 
taking an active part in political campaigns, it was necessary to 
“balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a 
congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the 
supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of 
government.”
66
 The statute would be evaluated, therefore, on whether 
the benefit of the speech restriction outweighed the burden, not on 
whether the restriction was a necessary means to a non-First 
Amendment end.
67
 By jettisoning the germaneness inquiry of earlier 
unconstitutional conditions cases, Mitchell charted a new path for 
public employee speech cases. 
As deployed in Mitchell, the balancing test was deferential to 
Congress. The majority maintained that the legislature had the primary 
responsibility for determining how much to regulate the political 
conduct of federal employees,
68
 and found no reason to second guess 
Congress’s judgment that the Hatch Act was necessary to maintain the 
integrity and competency of the federal workforce.
69
 Concerns as to 
the statute’s breadth were dismissed as “matters of detail for 
Congress.”
70
 Mitchell relegated the courts to ensuring that regulations 
of public employees’ political conduct did not “pass[] beyond the 
general existing conception of governmental power.”
71
 The majority 
                                                          
66
 United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947). 
Petitioners in Mitchell were federal employees. The justices followed the 
doctrinal trend and declined to invoke the privilege doctrine. The majority 
acknowledged instead that the Bill of Rights protects government employees. Id. 
at 94-95 (stating that the Hatch Act interfered “with what otherwise would be 
the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments”); 
id. at 100 (providing that Congress may not “enact a regulation providing that no 
Republican, Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal 
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work”). 
Although Mitchell sustained the Hatch Act, the decision “was not put upon the 
ground that government employment is a privilege to be conferred or withheld at 
will.” Douds, 339 U.S. at 405. 
67
 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95-96. 
68
 Id. at 102. 
69
 Id. at 103. 
70
 Id. at 102. 
71
 Id. 
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defined that phrase—it does not appear in prior state or federal case 
law—as the product of “practice, history, and changing education, 
social and economic conditions,”
72
 suggesting that when engaging in 
balancing, judges should defer to societal and economic trends as well 
as longstanding political arrangements.
73
 
Three years later, the Court in Douds addressed the anti-
Communist affidavit requirement in the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
provision excluded from the benefits of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) unions led by officers who refused to renounce 
Communism.
74
 Confronted with another unconstitutional conditions 
problem, the Court turned again to the balancing test. This time, 
however, the Court went further than it had in Mitchell and adopted 
interest balancing as the correct framework for resolving constitutional 
challenges to conditions on government privileges. “When particular 
conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation 
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,” Chief 
Justice Vinson wrote for the majority, “the duty of the court is to 
determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater 
protection under the particular circumstances presented.”
75
 As in 
Mitchell, the Court was not inclined to question Congress’s judgment 
that the challenged provision addressed a substantial harm, or to 
quibble with the chosen means.
76
 Once again, the scales tipped in 
Congress’s favor. 




 As evidence that the Hatch Act was within the “general existing conception of 
government power,” Mitchell asserted that the prohibition on political activity 
“has the approval of long practice by the [United States Civil Service] 
Commission, court decisions upon similar problems and a large body of 
informed public opinion.” Id. at 102-03. 
74
 Douds, 339 U.S. at 385-86. 
75
 Id. at 399. 
76
 The stated purpose of the provision was to end the practice of “political strikes,” 
the term given to describe the phenomena of labor stoppages called by 
Communist union leaders for the sole purpose of disrupting commerce. Id. at 
388-89 (describing the “great mass of material” submitted to Congress 
demonstrating the problem of political strikes). The Court concluded that 
considerable reasons were offered in support of the provision, and, in any event, 
that it was “in no position to substitute its judgment as to the necessity or 
desirability of the statute for that of Congress.” Id. at 400-01. As for the burden 
on speech, the majority found that the requirement targeted a small cadre of 
labor leaders “with occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of 
the country.” Id. at 404. 
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Finally, the Court in Dennis upheld the conviction of twelve 
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for 
advocating and organizing the violent overthrow of the United States 
government in violation of the Smith Act.
77
 The decision did not 
produce a majority opinion. A plurality of four, led by Chief Justice 
Vinson, relied on the clear and present danger test, as restated by 
Judge Learned Hand in the appeals court opinion below.
78
 In a solo 
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter contended that the convictions failed 
the clear and present danger test.
79
 Until Dennis, he asserted, the 
Court’s speech decisions lent constitutional support to “uncritical 
libertarian generalities.”
80
 What troubled Frankfurter even more, 
however, was the perceived absence of judicial restraint in the Court’s 
free speech jurisprudence.
81
 “The demands of free speech in a 
democratic society as well as the interest in national security,” he 
wrote, “are better served by candid and informed weighing of the 
competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by 
announcing dogmas too inflexible for non-Euclidian problems to be 
solved.”
82
 In line with the majority opinions in Mitchell and Douds, he 
thought the legislature held the principal responsibility of weighing the 
                                                          
77
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
78
 Under the Hand-Vinson formula, courts must ask in each case “whether the 
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510. Under the original 
formulation of the clear and present danger standard, the question was “whether 
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919). 
79




 Justice Frankfurter faulted the justices for deviating from their “normal duty in 
sitting in judgment on legislation” in cases implicating the First Amendment. Id. 
at 526-7. He cited the famous footnote 4 of Carolene Products among other 
examples of the Court’s disregard for its traditional, limited role in reviewing 
legislation. “It has been suggested, with the casualness of a footnote,” he 
complained, that legislation restricting the freedom of expression “is not 
presumptively valid.” Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938)). 
82
 Id. at 524-25. 
2015 Wrong Turns in Public Employee Speech Law 363 
interests,
83




Although Frankfurter did not attract the votes of the other justices 
in Dennis, his pragmatic, anti-absolutist view of the First Amendment 
characterized the Court’s jurisprudence over the following decade. 




C. The Balancing Critics 
Balancing elicited fierce opposition from Justice Black. In a string 
of dissents, Black described the legal doctrine as a “justification for 
tyranny,”
86





 and a device for turning “our ‘Government of the 
people, by the people and for the people’ into a government over the 
people.”
89
 As a First Amendment textualist, Black summarized his 
view in a sentence: “I read ‘no law abridging’ to mean no law 
abridging.”
90
 That text, he argued, permanently fixed the First 
Amendment’s scales on the side of free speech by putting this right 
“wholly beyond the reach of federal power to abridge.”
91
 The framers 
of the amendment, Black wrote in another opinion, already “made a 
                                                          
83
 Id. at 525. 
84
 Compare id. at 539-40 (stating that laws “outside of the pale of fair judgment” 
should be overturned) with United Pub. Workers of Am. (CIO) v. Mitchell, 330 
U.S. 75, 102 (1947) (maintaining that laws that “pass[] beyond the general 
existing conception of governmental power” will not be sustained). 
85
 The Court invoked the balancing of interests test in the following cases: 
Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90-
91 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78 (1959) (concerning mandatory 
public disclosure); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (discussing Douds and further 
concerning mandatory public disclosure); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109, 134 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (concerning 
government interrogations); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1961), 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961) (concerning bar 
membership and citing additional balancing cases). 
86
 Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. at 165. 
87
 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. at 111. 
88
 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961). 
89
 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. at 67-68. 
90
 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959). 
91
 Id. at 157-58. 
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choice of values.”
92
 According to Black, balancing invited judges to 
abridge the freedom of speech whenever the values “they most highly 
cherish outweigh the values most highly cherished by the Founders.”
93
 
Black thus objected to what he understood as an effort to replace the 
protections offered under the text of the First Amendment with highly 
subjective judicial evaluations. 
Justice Black dissented from the balancing trilogy and was joined 
in dissent by Justice Douglas in two of the cases.
94
 The anti-balancing 
camp grew with the addition to the Court of Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Brennan. In 1961, these four justices agreed that the Court: 
should not permit governmental action that plainly abridges 
constitutionally protected rights of the People merely because a 
majority believes that on “balance” it is better, or “wiser” to 
abridge those rights than to leave them free. The inherent vice of 
the “balancing test” is that it purports to do just that.
95
  
A diverse collection of academics also took aim at the doctrine. 
First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn argued that balancing 
undermined the First Amendment’s commitment to a system of self-
government by allowing public officials to regulate speech whenever 
they deemed the restrictions as necessary to serve the greater good.
96
 
Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson wrote that the doctrine 
left the First Amendment without any meaning.
97
 If legislatures may 
enact “reasonable” abridgments of free speech, the amendment 
provided no protection that was not already afforded under the due 
process clause.
98
 Professor Emerson further contended that the 
doctrine left judges in an untenable position. Either they acceded to the 
legislature’s weighing of the relevant issues or they assumed the 
function of a legislature and reweighed the interests themselves.
99
 
Harvard Law School Professor Charles Fried echoed Professor 
                                                          
92
 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399 (1967). 
93
 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. at 75. 
94
 Douglas took no part in the consideration of Douds. Am. Communications 
Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950). 
95
 In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 111 (1961). 
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 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, 109-14 (1960). 
97
 Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
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Emerson’s sentiment that ad hoc balancing was incompatible with the 
role of the judiciary.
100
 Professor Fried argued that courts should 




IV. PICKERING V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
It is widely maintained that the 1968 case of Pickering v. Board of 
Education marked the arrival of the balance of interests test in cases 
involving public employee free speech claims.
102
 This contention is 
problematic for two reasons. As already discussed, the balancing test 
did not originate with Pickering. More than twenty years earlier, in 
Mitchell, the Court applied balancing to resolve a First Amendment 
challenge to the Hatch Act brought by public employees. Second, 
Pickering itself did not rely on the balance of interests test. To 
recognize the reemergence of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
it is essential to understand Pickering’s actual holding. 
A. Pickering’s Letter 
The suit followed a series of school funding maneuvers that led to 
the dismissal of a teacher, Marvin L. Pickering. In 1961, the school 
board for district 205 in Will County, Illinois, submitted a pair of bond 
proposals for the erection of two high schools.
103
 The voters rejected 
the first proposal, but approved the second, authorizing $5.5 million 
for the school project.
104
 The schools were built with the proceeds of 
the bond sales.
105
 Three years later, the school board presented voters 
with two measures that would have raised additional revenues for the 
school district.
106
 After the first measure failed, a group of teachers 
and the superintendent of schools published newspaper articles in 
                                                          
100
 Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme 
Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 773 (1963) (critiquing use of 
“particularistic” balancing in the adjudication of constitutionally protected 
individual liberties). 
101
 Id. at 778. 
102
 See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 
U.S. 563 (1968). 
103






 Id. at 566. 
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support of increased revenues for school expenditures. Unmoved, the 
voters again thwarted the tax increase.
107
 
Two days after the defeat of the second tax proposal, Pickering 
published a 900-word manifesto in the letters section of a local 
newspaper.
108
 He blamed the school board for the defeat of the tax 
measure, claiming that taxpayers lost faith in the board because it 
spent lavishly on athletics at the expense of investing in the 
classroom.
109
 Pickering dismissed the articles in favor of the tax 
measure published by the teacher group as reflective of the views of 
only a handful of his colleagues.
110
 “Did you know,” he wrote, “that 
those letters had to have the approval of the superintendent before they 
could be put in the paper? That’s the kind of totalitarianism teachers 
live in at the high school, and your children go to school in.”
111
 The 




Pickering demanded a bill of particulars and a hearing before the 
board.
113
 The board charged that he had falsely impugned the 
“motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and 
competence of both the school board and the school administration,” 
and that his letter threatened to disrupt faculty discipline and incite 
“controversy, conflict, and dissention” in the school system and the 
community.
114
 At the hearing, however, no evidence was presented 
related to the reputations of the board members or superintendent,
115
 
nor were any facts proven concerning the disruption of faculty 
discipline or harm elsewhere due to Pickering’s letter.
116
 The hearing 
focused instead on the truth or falsity of Pickering’s statements.
117
 The 




 Id. at 566, 575-78. 
109
 Id at 575-76. 
110
 Id. at 577. 
111
 Id. at 577-78. 
112
 Id. at 566; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Tp. High 
School Dist., 1967 WL 113867 at *13. 
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 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *8. 
114
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566-67. 
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board determined that the statements were false and upheld the 
dismissal.
118
 The state courts affirmed.
119
 
B. Justice Marshall’s Opinion 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pickering addresses three issues: 
whether public employees forfeit their First Amendment rights by 
virtue of their employment, whether a false statement can be grounds 
for dismissal, and whether other special circumstances justify the 
dismissal of a public employee for speaking out on a matter of public 
concern. 
The first issue was straightforward. The Court had long ago 
rejected the privilege doctrine and had recognized public employee 
speech rights (weighed albeit against the government’s competing 
interest) in several cases beginning with Mitchell.
120
 The lower court 
in Pickering appeared nevertheless to veer into forbidden territory. It 
noted that Pickering was “not a mere member of the public” since he 
had opted to teach in public schools, and determined that he was 
therefore bound to refrain from conduct that he otherwise “would have 
an undoubted right to engage in.”
121
 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Marshall “unequivocally rejected” the suggestion that public employee 
free speech cases could be regarded as involving no more than a 
condition on a governmental privilege.
122
 
The second issue prompted the Court to jettison the balancing test 
and make a threshold germaneness determination. In response to the 
school board’s argument that it was justified in dismissing Pickering 
for making false statements, Pickering argued that the board could not 
sanction him unless it satisfied the New York Times rule.
123
 In New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public 
official needed to show “actual malice” in order to recover in a libel 
suit.
124
 The Court later applied the New York Times rule to criminal 
defamation actions, requiring a showing of actual malice for the state 






 United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
121
 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 36 Ill. 2d 568, 577 (1967). 
122
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 1967 WL 113867 at *11, *22-*38. 
124
 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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to impose sanctions for defaming public officials.
125
 Pickering 
contended that the same rule should cover the dismissal of public 
employees premised on false statements.
126
 
Pickering asked, in essence, for a return to the unconstitutional 
conditions standard that applied before the Court in Stephenson 
introduced the germaneness requirement.
127
 He argued that the rule in 
New York Times should apply to a condition on a government 
privilege—his job—in the same way that the rule applied in 
prosecutions of defamation seeking money damages.
128
 In other words, 
if the New York Times rule could not be undone directly, it also could 
not be undone indirectly by conditioning public employment on the 
forfeiture of the protections afforded by the rule. 
Marshall’s response to Pickering’s argument signaled the end, or at 
least the beginning of the end, of the balancing test. At the highpoint 
of interest balancing, the Court held that in scenarios such as 
Pickering’s, where the state’s action “results in an indirect, 
conditional, partial abridgment of speech,” the role of the Court was to 
weigh the conflicting interests to determine which demanded the 
greater protection.
129
 Marshall declined to go down this path. 
Pickering may well be remembered for Marshall’s dictum about the 
need for balancing.
130
 In actuality, however, the case was not decided 
on the basis of balancing. Presented with a speech condition on public 
employment, Marshall engaged in a germaneness inquiry to determine 
the correct level of scrutiny. The discussion of balancing is pure dicta. 
Marshall resolved the threshold question by considering whether 
Pickering’s job made it necessary for him to surrender the First 
Amendment protections afforded under the New York Times rule.
131
 
The content of the letter showed that it was not.
132
 The statements that 
Pickering made, Marshall asserted, were not “directed towards any 
person with whom [Pickering] would normally be in contact in the 
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 Id. at 567. 
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course of his daily work as a teacher,” and thus there was “no question 
of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony 
among coworkers.”
133
 Marshall further recognized that Pickering 
wrote the letter about the board members, with whom Pickering lacked 
“the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively 
be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their 
proper functioning.”
134
 Pickering’s statements about athletic funding, 
moreover, did not concern “matters so closely related to the day-to-day 
operations of the schools.”
135
 Had Pickering disclosed sensitive 
information, Marshall suggested that a less protective speech rule 
would have been appropriate given that the school would have found it 
difficult to rebut the statements “because of the teacher’s presumed 
greater access to real facts.”
136
 Nothing in the letter, however, 
convinced Marshall that denial of the New York Times rule was 
appropriate in light of Pickering’s employment. 
Pickering prevailed on the threshold question. “[I]n a case such as 
the present one,” Marshall concluded, “in which the fact of 
employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the 
subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we 
conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the 
general public that he seeks to be.”
137
 The New York Times rule thus 
controlled. The threshold determination was all but dispositive. 
Because the board presented no evidence that Pickering had made any 
of the objectionable statements with actual malice, an essential 
element under the controlling rule, the Court found no grounds for his 
dismissal and reversed the ruling below.
138
 
Courts and commentators, of course, have read Pickering as 
establishing a balancing test.
139
 This interpretation, however, neglects 
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 For the courts’ reception of Pickering, see, e.g., Bernasconi v. Tempe 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding that 
under Pickering the court “must strike the balance” between competing 
interests); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1976) (considering 
whether public employee’s comments on matters of public concern “tilt[ed] the 
Pickering balance in favor of first amendment protection”); Paulos v. Breier, 
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the decision’s actual holding, which Justice Marshall reiterated at the 
end of the opinion: “In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent 
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a 
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance 
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public 
employment.”
140
 Thomas Emerson pointed out that the Pickering 
opinion “ultimately seems to rest upon those considerations relevant to 
the question whether the publication of Pickering’s letter was 
incompatible with his commitments as an employee in the school 
system.”
141
 Emerson was right—a conclusion bolstered by the fact that 
Justice Black, a balancing Geiger counter, did not object to any 
claimed use of balancing in the majority opinion.
142
 Outside of the 
public employment context, the Supreme Court has referred to 
Pickering as an unconstitutional conditions case.
143
 
                                                                                                                                         
507 F.2d 1383, 1385 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Pickering for the proposition that a 
“balance must be struck between the First Amendment interests of a state 
employee and the interests of the state in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services that it performs through its employees” ); Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 
1334, 1336 (4th Cir. 1974) (providing that Pickering “necessitates a weighing of 
interest[s]”); Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 
1971) (maintaining that under Pickering, a public employee’s speech rights 
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scholarly treatment of the case, see, e.g., Schoen, supra note 9, at 8 
(summarizing Pickering as holding that public employee speech claims must be 
resolved by interest balancing); Solomon, supra note 11, at 453 (stating that 
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claims); Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 
MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1977) (same). 
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V. THE RETURN OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS ANALYSIS 
Before Pickering, the public employee free speech cases that 
reached the Supreme Court revolved around the liberties and duties of 
dissenters in Cold War America. Loyalty oaths, anti-Communist 
affidavits, and conscientious objectors were recurring themes in these 
cases.
144
 Pickering, by contrast, could hardly have concerned a set of 
facts farther removed from an Arthur Miller drama, and was more in 
line with the ordinary, everyday controversies of politics and public 
life—school funding, athletic facilities, a bond issue, and the allocation 
of taxpayer dollars by government administrators.
145
 If Pickering did 
not produce a genuine doctrinal change, the case did very much signal 
the mainstreaming of the First Amendment. 
Part V of this Article examines four categories of public employee 
speech cases that have reached the Supreme Court since Pickering: 
political patronage and activity cases, publishing and public speaking 
cases, public-sector union dues cases, and insubordinate employee 
cases. If these cases, like Pickering, do not raise the type of existential 
questions that fueled the sharp fissures between “Frankfurtean” 
pragmatists and “Blackean” absolutists on the Cold War Court, they 
demonstrate the wide array of public employee speech problems that 
the mainstreaming of the First Amendment has brought. 
Notwithstanding this diversity, the modern Court has relied 
consistently on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to resolve 
public employee speech cases. 
A. Political Affiliation and Activity 
After Pickering, the Court decided a line of cases involving 
government workers and contactors who argued that patronage 
practices were an infringement on their right to free speech. The first 
of these cases, Elrod v. Burns, arose from the home of a long tradition 
of machine politics—Cook County, Illinois.
146
 In 1970, the voters of 
Cook County elected a new sheriff, Richard J. Elrod, who promptly 
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dismissed, or threatened to dismiss, employees who refused to join or 
support the Democratic Party.
147
 Three former employees and one 




The Court ruled in favor of the employees but split on the 
rationale. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion maintained that a 
condition on public employment that infringes on free speech must be 
the least restrictive means to a vital government purpose and “the 
benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected 
rights.”
149
 Justice Stewart’s concurrence, joined by Justice Blackmun, 
stated that the sole question presented in the case was whether a non-
policymaking government employee may be discharged “from a job 




Four years later, in Branti v. Finkel,
151
 the Court reaffirmed Elrod 
but clarified that germaneness is the dispositive factor. The suit was 
brought by two Republican public defenders after the newly installed 
Democratic county public defender discharged them to make room for 
Democratic appointees.
152
 The majority opinion by Justice Stevens 
explained that the standard for determining the constitutionality of 
patronage discharges “is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved.”
153
 The Branti Court found 
no reason for restricting appointments to the public defender’s office 
to members of the “in-party.”
154
 A public defender, Stevens 
maintained, discharges his or her public duties by serving the 
undivided interests of individual clients.
155
 Interposing a party-
affiliation requirement, thus, undermines the public defender’s ability 
to do his or her job effectively.
156
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 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
152
 Id. at 509. 
153
 Id. at 518. 
154
 See id. at 519-20. 
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The Branti standard remains controlling. In 1996, the Court 
extended the protection against adverse action on the basis of political 
affiliation to government contractors.
157
 The majority opinion in that 
case began by quoting the language from the Branti holding that 
political affiliation must be an “appropriate” requirement.
158
 The Court 
further held that the government must base its contracting decisions on 




The constitutionality of conditions preventing partisan activities by 
government employees is the flip side of the patronage decisions. In 
1973, the Court in United States Civil Service Commission v. National 
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO reaffirmed its decision in 
Mitchell, discussed in the previous section, and upheld the Hatch 
Act.
160
 Letter Carriers does not provide a clear answer as to whether 
the Court viewed a balancing of interests test or unconstitutional 
conditions analysis as the appropriate method for reaching a decision. 
Justice White’s majority opinion sustaining the prohibition largely 
followed precedent rather than either of these approaches.
161
 To the 
extent that Letter Carriers subjected the Hatch Act to a fresh review, 
however, the opinion relied on the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.
162
 As in the patronage cases, the Court framed the issue in 
terms of the means-end fit between the speech restriction and the 
purported government interest.
163
 In the patronage cases, the Court 
concluded that political affiliation is not an appropriate criterion for 
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 U. S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
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history” favored restricting the partisan activities of public servants. Id. at 557. 
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 See id. at 564. 
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 Id. 
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many government jobs.
164
 In Letter Carriers, the Court ruled that 
prohibiting partisan activity by government workers, on the other 
hand, is “essential” to “this great end of Government—the impartial 
execution of the laws.”
165
 The Court explained that the restriction 
stunted the growth of political machines inside public bureaucracies, 
and excused public employees from having to curry political favor 
with their superiors.
166
 A necessary part of the effective operation of 
government, the majority further asserted, is maintaining the 
appearance of impartially.
167
 The prohibition was thus germane to 
government employment because government employees who 
campaigned for elected officials gave the impression of partiality. 
B. Publishing and Public Speaking 
In Snepp v. United States, the Court affirmed the validity of the 
CIA’s prepublication review process for intelligence-related 
materials.
168
 The case revolved around the book, “Decent Interval,” 
which Frank Snepp wrote about his tenure as an intelligence officer in 
Vietnam.
169
 In violation of his employment contract, Snepp submitted 
the book manuscript for publication without submitting it to the CIA 
for prior review and approval.
170
 He argued that the prepublication 
clearance process was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
 171
 
The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the process for two reasons, 
both of which pertained to germaneness. The Court declared that the 
provision was necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure and to 
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maintain the “appearance of confidentiality,” which was essential to 
the continued availability of foreign sources of information.
172
 The 




Other government workers fared better with respect to a federal 
law that prohibited them from receiving honoraria for appearances, 
speeches, and articles.
174
 In United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union, unlike in Snepp, the Court found no relationship between the 
speech restriction and the government’s ability to operate 
effectively.
175
 There was no cognizable link between the honorarium 
ban and the need to maintain employee discipline or morale.
176
 Nor 
was the restriction related to the government’s interest in avoiding the 
appearance of impropriety. In the case of a single event, speech, or 
article, the law applied even if the subject matter was unrelated to the 
government worker’s official duties or status.
177
 There is “scant harm,” 
Justice Stevens concluded for the majority, “or appearance of harm, 
resulting from [a government worker]’s accepting pay to lecture on the 
Quaker religion or to write dance reviews.”
178
 Stevens further 
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suggested that the statute might have passed muster if the ban applied 
only to subject matter related to a government employee’s job,
179
 but 
he declined to rewrite the statute from the bench. The ban failed, in 
sum, for the same reason that the CIA’s prepublication clearance 
regime survived—germaneness. 
C. Public-Sector Union Dues 
The Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of mandatory 
public-sector union dues began with a balance that was already struck. 
As in Letter Carriers, which addressed a renewed challenge to the 
Hatch Act, the Court was not writing on a blank slate. Before 
Pickering, the justices decided Railway Employees’ Department v. 
Hanson
180
 and Machinists v. Street,
181
 a pair of cases that addressed 
mandatory private-sector union dues. When the Court first entertained 
a challenge to mandatory public-sector union dues in 1977, in Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, a majority of the justices described 
Hanson and Street as “go[ing] far to resolve the issue.”
182
 
In these earlier cases, the Court affirmed the use of mandatory 
union dues for the limited purpose of collective bargaining. Both cases 
concerned the Railway Labor Act (RLA)’s union-shop provision, 
which authorized carriers and unions to require union membership as a 
condition of employment.
183
 A private agreement between workers 
and management typically does not create the necessary conditions for 
a First Amendment injury.
184
 The RLA, however, implicated Congress 
because the statute expressly preempted state “right-to-work” laws that 
otherwise would have protected the right of workers to refuse to join a 
union.
185
 In Hanson, employees from a “right-to-work” state 
challenged a private union shop arrangement.
 186
 They argued that the 
First Amendment excused them from paying union dues to support 
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political and ideological causes that they opposed. The Court upheld 
the union shop arrangement but cautioned that its holding was limited 
to dues attributable to the union’s collective-bargaining work.
187
 In 
Street, the employees proved that the union exceeded this narrow 
authorization and used employee dues for political causes.
188
 The 
Court, however, did not reach the First Amendment issue. It held 
instead that the RLA prohibited the use of dues for political purposes, 
and therefore, the employer’s actions were illegal under the statute.
189
 
The Abood Court read Hanson and Street to hold that mandatory 
union dues were “constitutionally justified by the legislative 
assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the 
system of labor relations established by Congress.”
190
 The Court 
explained that the central element in the RLA was the system of 
exclusive union representation that it established.
191
 Under this system, 
employees designate a single collective-bargaining representative, 
which, the Court asserted, streamlines labor-management negotiations. 
The Court further noted that the collective-bargaining agent is 
obligated to represent every member of a bargaining unit equally, 
union member or not.
192
 Requiring every member of a bargaining unit 
to defray the costs of collective-bargaining, the Court explained, “has 
been thought to distribute fairly the costs” among those who benefit 




Turning to the case in question, the Abood Court noted that the 
State of Michigan adopted an essentially identical structure for labor-
management relations as that which existed under the RLA.
194
 State 
law provided for exclusive representation, a duty of fair representation, 
and authorized collective-bargaining agents to collect agency fees 
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from members of a bargaining unit.
195
 The Court found that the 
governmental interests which justified the imposition of agency fees 
under the RLA were equally relevant in the public sector,
196
 and that 
public-sector workers did not have a stronger First Amendment right 
than their private-sector counterparts to avoid these fees.
197
 
Abood was not contested until 2014, in Harris v. Quinn.
198
 The 
challengers were personal assistants who provided in-home care to 
persons suffering from disabilities.
199
 The State of Illinois paid the 
personal assistants through two state programs subsidized by 
Medicaid.
200
 Under the same basic arrangement that existed in the 
RLA cases and Abood, an exclusive agent represented the personal 
assistants in collective-bargaining negotiations with the state, and 
extracted fees from all personal assistants, including the challengers, to 
defray the agency costs related to these negotiations.
201
 The 
challengers asserted that the mandatory assessments were 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
202
 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion viewed Abood as upholding 
mandatory agency fees because they were related to the state’s 
authority to negotiate the employment terms of state employees with a 
single representative who bargains for all similarly-situated public 
employees.
203
 Under this theory, the mandatory agency fees are no 
more than the union’s costs of complying with the state’s mandate:
204
 
the state has decided that it desires to execute and administer 
employment contracts with public employees through a single 
representative and the employee’s representative will be compensated 
in this manner. 
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In Harris, however, Justice Alito determined that the situation was 
quite different. The mandatory dues were not germane to the state’s 
desire to negotiate employment terms through a single source because 
the state afforded the union virtually nothing to negotiate with regard 
to the employment terms of the personal assistants.
205
 The personal 
assistants were paid a uniform hourly wage set by statute, and were 
ineligible to receive statutory retirement and health insurance benefits 
as well as a host of other benefits available to state employees.
206
 
Subject to minimal baseline requirements, individual clients had 
complete discretion to hire the personal assistant of their choosing.
207
 
The duties of the personal assistants were established in a plan that 
needed the approval of a client and the client’s physician, but not the 
state.
208
 Personal assistants worked at the pleasure of their clients, who 
could terminate the employment relationship without permission from 
the state.
209
 And in the event that a personal assistant wished to protest 
the terms and conditions set by a client, there was no grievance 
procedure involving the union.
210
 There was, in short, no necessary 
link between the agency fees and the union’s collective bargaining 
work. 
As in Stephenson and Pickering, the germaneness inquiry in Harris 
determined the level of scrutiny. Once Justice Alito determined that 
the agency fees were not connected to the state’s authority over the 
conduct of collective bargaining in the public sector, he subjected the 




Harris did not reach the larger issue of whether a system of 
genuine collective bargaining in the public sector is germane to the 
effective operation of government. In other words, the majority did not 
resolve the case of the public employee who argues that the union may 
not collect agency fees because mandatory collective bargaining, like 
most patronage practices, serves no real governmental purpose. Abood 
still controls there. The majority in Harris suggested, however, that 
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 Id. at 2637. 
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Abood was too hasty in adopting the industrial peace rationale from 
two railway cases decided more than sixty years ago, and that 
mandatory public-sector unionism, unlike its private-sector 
counterpart, has been principally responsible for the “mushroom[ing]” 
of employee wages and benefits paid for by taxpayers.
212
 
D. Insubordinate Employees 
The government occasionally takes adverse action against 
employees based on something that they have said. Consistent with the 
doctrinal trend discussed thus far, the Supreme Court has shown little 
enthusiasm in these cases for weighing the competing interests and 
determining whether the speech is protected when applying the 
balancing test. The Court has gone so far as devising a threshold 
requirement—the public-concern test—that must be satisfied before 
Pickering’s putative balancing test is triggered. 
The Court articulated the public-concern test in Connick v. Myers, 
a 1983 case concerning an assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers, 
who was fired after she protested an impending transfer by circulating 
a questionnaire among employees.
213
 Among other things, the 
questionnaire queried views on the office’s transfer policy, morale, 
and whether the line prosecutors had confidence in their superiors, 
who were listed by name.
214
 
In a 5-4 ruling, Connick held that the First Amendment is not 
implicated every time a public employer takes an adverse employment 
action against an employee based on the employee’s speech.
215
 Public 
employees, the Court maintained, had no free speech claim where the 
expression at issue did not concern “any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community.”
216
 Connick further provided that 
whether an expression touched on a public concern depended on the 
“content, form, and context” of the expression.
217
 
Turning to the statements at issue, the Court held that all but one of 
the items on Myers’s survey failed the public-concern test. Only the 
Myers’s query as to whether employees had felt pressured to campaign 
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for candidates supported by the district attorney’s office touched on an 
issue of public concern.
218
 Even though the Court reasoned that this 
lone statement gave Myers a viable First Amendment interest, the 
strength of that interest was greatly diminished by the Court’s 
conclusion that the questionnaire essentially concerned a private 
matter, an intramural personnel dispute prompted by an employee’s 
dissatisfaction with her pending transfer.
 219
 “Government offices,” the 
Court warned, “could not function if every employment decision 
became a constitutional matter.”
220
 Myers’s limited First Amendment 
right was not sufficiently compelling to require the district attorney to 
stand by while Myers distributed a survey that reasonably threatened 




Connick’s public-concern test is problematic for two reasons. First, 
as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the Court rejected the public-
concern test less than a decade prior in another First Amendment 
context.
222
 In New York Times, as earlier discussed, the Court held that 
the First Amendment required public officials to show actual malice to 
prevail in defamation actions.
223
 Later, the Court extended the New 
York Times rule to public figures.
224
 Then, in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., a plurality of the Court would have extended the 
protections of the New York Times rule to any expression about an 
issue of public concern.
225
 Three years later, however, the Court in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. rejected the public-concern test as a tool 
for determining the applicability of the New York Times rule in state 
libel suits.
226
 Connick did not explain why the public-concern test was 
appropriate in light of Gertz. 
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Second, the test is self-contradictory. The distinction between 
issues of public and private concern is rooted in the notion that speech 
related to public concerns is essential to self-government and therefore 
deserving of heighted protection. The public-concern test, however, 
undermines self-government by allowing courts to function as the 
ultimate arbiters of what constitutes an issue of public concern. In the 
words of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Rosenbloom, later quoted by the 
majority in Gertz, the test requires courts “to somehow pass on the 
legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject” and to determine 
“what information is relevant to self-government.”
227
 As Professor 
Robert Post concluded, the public-concern test “displaces the very 
democratic processes it seeks to facilitate.”
228
 
The Court in Connick, moreover, had other means available for 
preventing the over-constitutionalization of public employment 
disputes. Using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court 
could have ruled that Myers’s survey was incompatible with her duties 
as a public prosecutor. Employment in the public sector entails 
forgoing the right to respond to management’s personnel decisions by 
creating a “mini-insurrection,” as Myers apparently did, within the 
office.
229
 The Connick Court could have relied on the unconstitutional 
conditions reasoning in Pickering. The Court concluded that the 
teacher was entitled to First Amendment protection because there was 
“no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors 
or harmony among coworkers.”
230
 The school district’s reprisal against 
his letter, in other words, was not germane to the state’s legitimate 
interest in the efficient and effective provision of the benefit of public 
education. In Connick, by contrast, there was, at least arguably, a 
nexus between Myers’s termination and the state’s non-speech related 
interest in the efficient operation of a public service. The use of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would have removed the need for 
the court to assign itself the authority of determining what expressions 
are of public importance. 
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The cases that followed Connick lend credence to Professor Post’s 
claim that there is no “principled method” for applying the public-
concern test.
231
 In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court held that a deputy 
constable addressed a matter of public concern when she remarked, 
after hearing of the attempted assassination on President Reagan, “If 
they go for him again, I hope they get him.”
232
 In City of San Diego v. 
Roe, the public-concern determination went the other way where a 
police officer was fired for marketing sexually explicit videos on the 
Internet.
233
 Roe defined a matter of public concern as “something that 
is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of 
publication.”
234
 It is difficult to see how an employee’s expressed 
approval of the president’s assassination could be of any greater 
“value” to the public than the sexually explicit videos made by the 
police officer in Roe. Both would seem to be of no value to democratic 
self-government. 
The outcomes in Rankin and Roe are better grounded under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In Rankin, the Court reasoned 
that a speech restriction on a private expression is unlikely to be 
germane to certain public jobs.
235
 Where “an employee serves no 
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role,” the Court 
explained, “the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that 
employee’s private speech is minimal.”
236
 The deputy constable’s sole 
responsibility was entering information into a computer.
237
 She was 
not in contact with the public during working hours and did not wear a 
uniform or carry a gun.
238
 Since the comment regarding the 
assassination of President Reagan was made privately,
239
 the Court 
could have reasonably concluded that it was not incompatible with the 
deputy constable’s purely clerical duties. By this line of reasoning, the 
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public employer’s reprisal for the remark amounted to an 
unconstitutional burden on her employment. 
In Roe, by contrast, the Court found that the sexually explicit 
videos were made widely available and depicted the officer in a police 
uniform performing indecent acts in the course of official duties.
 240
 In 
this way, the public employee’s speech brought the professionalism of 
the department’s officers into “serious disrepute,” and “was 
detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”
241
 Thus, the 
sanction for distributing the lewd videos was germane to the city’s 
legitimate non-speech interest in maintaining the reputation and image 
of its police department. 
The Court’s tendency to obscure the application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine was apparent once again in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.
 242
 The Court held here that the First Amendment 
did not protect public employees from adverse employment action 
based on speech made pursuant to their public duties.
243
 The case arose 
from a disagreement between Richard Ceballos and his supervisors 
over a pending prosecution.
244
 Ceballos, a deputy prosecutor, wrote 
two memos recommending the dismissal of a case based on his review 
of the evidence and conversations with the affiant for a critical search 
warrant.
245
 The supervisors rejected the recommendation.
246
 Ceballos 
then testified for the defense in a hearing on its motion to quash the 
search warrant.
247
 The judge ruled in favor of the prosecution on the 
motion, and Ceballos was later transferred and denied a promotion.
248
 
Without weighing the value of Ceballos’s speech, the Court 
declared that it was entitled to no First Amendment protection.
249
 The 
“controlling factor” was that Ceballos made the statements as part of 
his job.
250
 Commentators widely criticized the holding as marking a 
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new departure from Pickering’s putative balancing standard.
251
 The 
outcome in Ceballos is explicable, however, under the now familiar 
unconstitutional conditions principles. Unlike in Pickering, Rankin, 
and Roe, the speech in question in Ceballos owed its existence to the 
government.
252
 The government created the position of calendar 
deputy, and was free, therefore, under the constitutional conditions 
doctrine to impose any conditions on calendar deputies that were 
germane to the effective performance of the position. The relevant 
condition in the case required Ceballos, as calendar deputy, to accept 
the work-related feedback given by his supervisors. This condition is 
commonplace in all forms of employment. It is germane to the 
employer’s purpose in providing the job in the first place. Supervisory 
control over work-related tasks reasonably ensures that the requested 
work is done professionally, in accordance with the standards set by 
the employer. Imagine if a judge could not discipline a law clerk who 
repeatedly turned in work products that disagreed with the judge’s 
interpretation of the law. Indeed, government employers need not be 
required to engage in “guerilla war” with subordinates over the 




Public employee speech problems have been called a “first 
amendment nightmare.”
254
 Realistically assessing the controlling 
standard is a helpful first step in addressing the array of First 
Amendment questions that continue to arise in the government 
employment context. This Article has argued that there has long been a 
gap between what the Supreme Court says and what it does in public 
employee speech cases. The Court invokes the language of balancing 
but follows the logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The 
proper way to understand the Court’s public employee speech 
jurisprudence is as a series of cases that determine the conditions 
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under which the First Amendment will apply. When the guarantees of 
the First Amendment control, a public employee has a relatively easy 
time in prevailing. It is getting to the First Amendment that is the 
tricky part, perhaps as it should be. 
 
